THE LEGACY OF AUGUSTINE

The Development of Christian Thought

The earliest Christian writings which we possess after the New Testament show us the Christian community assimilating the teaching of Jesus on the great commandment of love, on the Ten Commandments, and in the Sermon on the Mount, against a background of the historical continuity of God's action from creation through Judaism and the Jewish Law to his ever present Lordship over the world and all human activity. In its early stages Christian moral teaching was comparatively unreflective and unsystematic, happy to adopt, and adapt, from popular rules and codes of conduct whatever seemed congenial to its purpose. The entry into the Church, however, of educated pagans, and the growing hostility of outsiders, contributed to developments in Christian moral thinking and writing arising partly from the internal dynamism of its message and partly from the need to commend it and defend it in contemporary society. In this enterprise the second-century writers whom we know as the Apologists were not slow, while rebutting popular accusations of criminal practices and secret vices, to attack the public moral standards of pagan society and of its gods, while at the same time seeking common intellectual ground with what they considered best in pagan thought itself, including pagan ethical thought.\(^1\) In this continuing dialogue the two main ethical currents of thought which interacted with developing Christian thought can be identified generally as Neoplatonism and Stoicism, the former centring on human aspirations to control passion and to be released from all material restraints in order to enjoy an intellectual life of contemplation of the Good, and the latter, at a literally more mundane level, concentrating on a self-disciplined identification

with the Logos, or Reason, as the cosmic, almost pantheistic, principle of intelligibility at work in the world.²

Alongside such speculative and intellectual developments, of course, and influenced by them, Christian writers and leaders continued to expound and comment on God’s Word as it applied to the situations of daily family and social life, not only now in contrast or concord with non-Christian behaviour and thought, but also in often bitter controversy, whether within the Christian community itself or on the fringes of that community. And here the other major ethical current with which the mainstream of a developing theology of Christian moral behaviour had to contend was less a tributary to its thought, as were Neoplatonism and Stoicism in some regards, than a powerful undertow, or cross-current. It can be generally described as a doctrine of ultimate dualism between eternal conflicting powers of light and darkness, good and evil, spirit and matter, which was to be found specifically in its most influential forms in Gnosticism and Manichaeism, combining a strong element of spiritual élitism with a contempt for the bodily which could express itself paradoxically either in the most rigorous and disdainful asceticism or in the most thorough-going self-indulgence.³

The Influence of Augustine

It is against this intellectual and social background that we may consider the troubled person of Saint Augustine of Hippo, in

² Cf. F. C. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. i (London, 1947), for the general doctrines. For their influence on Christian thinkers, cf. Cross, *supra*, n. 1; M. Spanneut, *Le Stoicisme des peres de l'Église* (Paris, 1957); H. Chadwick, *The Sentences of Sextus: A Contribution to the History of Early Christian Ethics* (London, 1959). Not all the Christian Apologists were of such an accommodating temper, however, and the contemptuous polemic of Tertullian (‘Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?’) flung down a challenge not only to his heretical adversaries but to all subsequent Christian thinkers. In warning the Colossians against being ensnared by ‘philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition’ (Col. 2: 8), Paul had been drawing upon his own experience of Athens and its corrupting and competing claims to human ‘wisdom’ (cf. Acts 17: 16–21, 32–3). Jerusalem, the Church, and Christians have nothing in common with Athens, the Academy, and heretics. ‘Viderint, qui stoicum et platonicum et dialecticum Christianismum proteulerunt. Nobis curiositate opus non est, post Christum Jesum; nec inquisitione, post Evangelium’, *Liber de praescriptionibus adversus haereticos*, cap. 7; *PL* 2, 20.

whom, it has been claimed, ‘Western moral thought reached maturity’.\(^4\) Certainly, if one proceeds from the origins of Christian moral thinking to the late fourth and early fifth centuries, when Augustine flourished, one is well justified in judging that in him Christian moral theorizing had come of age. If today one looks back down the arches of some fifteen further centuries of Christian thought and life, on which it is almost impossible to calculate his influence, one would be forgiven for concluding that he has seemed not of an age but for all time.

Born into the lively African Christian Church in what is now Algeria, in 354, of a mixed Christian–pagan marriage, he received his schooling locally and in the nearby city of Carthage, where he became a teacher of rhetoric. His early Christian education seems to have been non-existent, and for nine years or more the growing Augustine found Manichaeism more intellectually satisfying than what he considered the puerilities of the Bible and the conservative Christianity of the local Donatist sect. In pursuit of his career he moved to Rome and then, at the age of thirty, as professor of rhetoric to Milan, which was then the centre of the Western Roman Empire, and where he fell under the spell of Ambrose, the local bishop, as well as of the Neoplatonist writings of Plotinus in Latin. It was here that occurred the famous garden scene of his exhausted moral conversion to Christianity and chastity,\(^5\) followed by his baptism by Ambrose and return to Africa with his illegitimate son and friends to form a Christian commune near his home town. Local pressure, however, led him to be ordained priest and, in 395, bishop in Hippo, where he spent the rest of his life, presiding, arbitrating, conferring, debating, preaching, writing, and above all, attacking the Christian deviations of Donatism, Manichaeism, Arianism and, especially, Pelagianism. He had been bishop for fifteen years when the immortal city of Rome fell to Alaric and his Goths, and for the next twenty years he was to witness the further disintegration of the great Western Roman Empire. As the old man


\(^5\) Vividly described as God having ‘broken the chains that bound me’ (Ps. 116: 16) in his Confessions, Book 8, culminating in chapter 12.
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of seventy-six lay dying in 430, on the eve of the Council of Ephesus, the Vandals were at the very gates of Hippo.

This was the man who, in the words of Newman, ‘formed the intellect of Europe’. In his own day he was an intellectual giant, as even the testy Scripture scholar, Jerome, acknowledged in a letter from Jerusalem. ‘Well done! You are renowned throughout the world. Catholics venerate you, and look upon you as a second founder of the old faith. And, surely what is a sign of greater glory, all the heretics detest you.’ After the disappearance of Western Roman culture into what are popularly known as the Dark Ages, and with the slow re-emergence of some measure of civil order and social stability, it was the writings of Augustine above all, next only to the Scriptures themselves, which helped to bridge the gulf with the Christian and classical past, and to animate the new missionary work of the Church in the European continent. As Portalié writes, echoing the judgment of Harnack and Eucken, ‘Augustine collects and condenses in his writings the intellectual treasures of the old world and transmits them to the new.’

In the catechizing of Frankish converts Augustine’s little work, *de catechizandis rudibus*, was used as a basic instrument, and found in Europe fields similar to those in North Africa where he had written it ‘to immunise catechumens against the seduction of paganism’. In the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury, ‘like all Western theologians, ... steeped himself in the writings of Augustine especially’, while in the twelfth century, as the Scholastic Age was getting into its stride, Augustine was a notable authority for William of Champeaux and his School of Saint Victor on the left bank of the Seine, as also for its greatest teacher, Hugh of Saint Victor. And his place was now assured for centuries to come by his inclusion as ‘the principal witness of theological tradition’ in the most enduring theological textbook of the Middle Ages, *The Book of the Sentences* of Peter Lombard. ‘Basically conservative, it was a

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6 On the role of individuals as initiators in ‘the Church of Rome’: ‘The great luminary of the western world is, as we know, St. Augustine; he, no infallible teacher, has formed the intellect of Europe’, *Apologia*, (Fontana, London, 1959), p. 296.

7 *Epist. 195, inter augustinianas; Pl. 33, 891.*

8 Op. cit., p. 84.

9 Angelini and Valsecchi, p. 77.

10 Jedin and Dolan, vol. iii, p. 470.

systematic and clearly and precisely organized summary of all the chief truths of the Christian faith that had been hitherto discussed by theologians. To every question it brought the relevant patristic citations and reliable solutions'.\textsuperscript{12} And it remained a universal textbook for theological students until the sixteenth century, when it was replaced by the \textit{Summa} of Theology of Thomas Aquinas, who knew his Lombard thoroughly, having himself, as a junior lecturer at Paris, like many another cut his pedagogical teeth by producing his own \textit{Commentary on the Sentences}.

Aquinas himself, of course, in the thirteenth century, notwithstanding his enthusiastic adoption of Aristotle (whose major works only then became available to medieval scholars in reliable translations), was profoundly influenced by the works and thought of Augustine, whom he cites probably more frequently than any other patristic authority. The influence of Augustine was 'ever present' in the English Church of the fourteenth century, as it continued to be in Paris and in other European universities.\textsuperscript{13} And if it could be said of John Henry Newman that he was a hidden \textit{peritus}, after his death, at the Second Vatican Council, the same could be said with even more force of the influence of Augustine at the Council of Trent, all the more so since, in addition to the presence of a strong Augustinian party at Trent, much of the labour of that Council was devoted to examining and attempting to clarify the hallowed teachings of Augustine himself which Luther, the Augustinian monk, had turned against the Roman Church.

Long after Trent the central influence of Augustine was to continue, unwearied although not entirely unquestioned, through the stormy seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of the incredible controversies on grace and the bitterly contested claims of his patronage for French Jansenism. Such was his abiding authority that in 1930 Pope Pius XI addressed the encyclical letter \textit{Ad Salutem} to the whole Catholic Church to commemorate the 1500th anniversary of the death of Augustine. The Pope recalled that the praise for Augustine in the Church, from Popes and others, had been unceasing during and since his lifetime; that the Church's Councils had used Augustine's very words to define Catholic truth; and that the Bishop of Hippo had illuminated not only Christian Africa but the entire Church. This he had achieved not only by his

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 89.  \hspace{1cm} \textsuperscript{13} Pantin, op. cit., p. 131.
foreful opposition to Donatist attempts to restrict the true Church of Christ to a corner of Africa in his use of the ringing principle ‘the judgement of the whole world is reliable’ (securus iudicat orbis terrarum), which had had such momentous effect in bringing Newman into the Catholic Church;\(^\text{14}\) but also in his teaching on God as man’s destiny, on the church and the Sacraments and the See of Rome, on the nature of God, the Trinity and Christology. Given the title Doctor of Grace by the Middle Ages, Augustine had forbidden all subsequent theologians to teach, on the one hand, the Reformation and Jansenist view that free will in man is an empty phrase since his lapse from original integrity, and on the other hand the inventions of the Pelagians that God’s grace is not freely bestowed on man and does not make all things possible.\(^\text{15}\)

Although the Pope did not mention it, it is of interest to note also that among other medieval monuments to the prestige of Augustine must be counted ‘an incredible number’ of apocryphal works attributed to him, and that the political thought of Augustine has also exercised a continual attraction on Western minds.\(^\text{16}\)

**Augustine’s Moral Teaching**

Apart from a few monographs on practical ethical subjects, Augustine composed no specific, far less systematic, works on morality, and his moral teaching, often occasional, parenthetical or digressionary, is to be found scattered throughout his enormous literary output of more than 100 books varying from short to very long indeed, over 200 letters and more than 500 sermons. All of this Armas describes as dealing with all, or almost all, the subjects of moral theology, both fundamental and special and constituting

\(^{14}\) *Contra epist. Parmenianii, 3, 24; Pl. 43, 101. Newman compared ‘those great words’ of the man who ‘was one of the prime oracles of Antiquity’ and their effect on him with the ‘Tolle, lege’ of the child ‘which converted Augustine himself’, *Apologia*, ch. 3, pp. 184–5.

\(^{15}\) *AAS 22* (1930), 201–34. ‘Vestigavitque adeo subtiliter feliciterque, ut, Doctor Gratiae nuncupatus deinceps atque habitus, ceteros catholicos posteriorum aetatum scriptores . . . prohibuerit, quominus . . . docerent aut in homine de pristina integritate deecto liberum arbitrium esse nomen sine re, ut prioribus novatoribus et iansenistis placuit, aut divinam gratiam nec gratuito nec omnia posse, quemadmodum Pelagiani fabulabantur’, ibid., p. 223.

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‘an immense arsenal’ for theologians of all subsequent centuries. In many problem areas the views of Augustine remain highly influential, whether on the absolute wrongness of suicide, or lying, or abortion. His teaching on sexual morality has dominated Catholic thought, as we shall see. And Augustine can reasonably be regarded as the founder of the Christian doctrine of the just war. On a more general level one can note his importance, along with Ambrose and through Gregory and Aquinas, in viewing the whole moral enterprise in the categories of the four cardinal virtues united in charity; his influence in establishing the classical distinction between mortal and venial sins; his laying the foundations of the theology of eternal law; and, of course, his insistence on the supreme importance of love of God in the Christian life, with its systematic expression in the famous distinction between ‘enjoyment’ and ‘use’. God alone may be enjoyed (frui): creatures may not constitute the final resting place of our hearts and wills, but may only be used (uti), as instruments and not as ends in themselves.

‘It is for yourself that you have made us, and our heart is restless, until it repose in you.’ For Augustine this most famous and typical of his aphorisms is not simply a statement of the facts of the case; it is also the basis of a universal moral injunction. For yourself (ad te), in you (in te); Augustine is par excellence the theologian of the preposition. This may be seen most brilliantly in his de Trinitate, in his analysis of the immanent relationships between Father, Son, and Spirit; but in the ad and the in of his cry in the Confessions, it may not be too much to say, we can find summed up the whole moral thinking of Saint Augustine—the overall orientation,

18 On suicide, cf de civ. dei, I, 25–27; PL 41, 38–40; and Epist. 204, 5; PL 33, 940–1; on lying, cf. de mendacio, 6, 9; PL 40, 495; on abortion, Sermo 10, 7; PL 38, 95.
19 Cf. infra, pp. 60–8.
22 Cf. de spir. et lit., 28; PL 44, 230; Epist. 104, 4, 14; PL 33, 394.
23 Cf. Contra Faustum, 22, 27; PL 42, 418.
24 ‘Frui est enim amore inhaerere aliqui rei propter se ipsam, ... sic in huius mortalitatis vita peregrinantes a Domino, si redire in patriam volumus ubi beati esse possimus, utendum est hoc mundo, non fruendum’, De Doctrina Christiana, 1, 4; PL 34, 20–1.
25 ‘Fecisti nos ad te; et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te’, Conf., 1, 1; PL 32, 661.
and yet the incompleteness and tension, of man until he find
fulfilment, resolution, and rest in God, his supreme Good. Burnaby
has suggested that among the three texts of Scripture which sum up
Augustine's Christian Platonism is the verse of the Psalm, \textit{mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est}: but for me it is good to be near
God. The translation is, of course, too weak for Augustine, who
saw in the psalmist's words a felicitous correction to the Platonists:
for me the supreme Good is cleaving to God. And it can also be
suggested that the summation of Augustine's theology of human
striving and beatitude, corresponding to the hope and the repose of
his statement in the \textit{Confessions}, is to be found above all in the
words of his other great love, Paul, that meantime in this life while
we are in the body we are distant from the Lord, on a pilgrimage of
faith which will culminate in vision: \textit{dum sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino: per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem}. These Augustinian tensions between pilgrimage and
homecoming, between using and enjoying, are well expressed
together in his statement, 'To enjoy is to cleave to something for its
own sake, in love . . . . And thus while we are on pilgrimage from
the Lord, in the life of this mortality, if we wish to return home
where we can be happy, we must use this world, not enjoy it'.

\textbf{The Dark Strain in Augustine}

It is a striking fact that most studies of, and tributes to, the work of
Augustine contain reference to what might be called a dark side to
his thought, and to what has been considered a note of pessimism in
his character and in his writings. Thus, one writer delicately
observes that 'not everything shines with the light of truth' in the
theology of Augustine, although such dark spots as are to be found
cannot dim the dazzling brightness of his whole work. And Jean
Guitton wonders 'to what degree Christianity still suffers from St.
Augustine's pessimism,' but concludes that 'when all is said and

\textsuperscript{26} J. Burnaby, \textit{Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine} (London, 1960), p. 41, the others, besides this (Ps. 72: 20) being Ps. 15: 2, and Wisd. 7: 27.
\textsuperscript{27} 2 Cor. 5: 6–8. Brown, pp. 323–4, brings out well the parallel political and
social implications of being a 'resident alien' in ancient Rome.
\textsuperscript{28} Supra, n. 24.
\textsuperscript{29} F. Moriones (ed.), \textit{Enchiridion theologicum Sancti Augustini} (Madrid, 1961),
p. xvii.
God of ‘the problem that was never far from his mind throughout a long life, the problem of sin and evil both in himself and in the whole world of spiritual being’. It is saddening to note how the works of this great and loving man, with their passages of sublime beauty and of moving eloquence, are often flawed by this note of melancholy, of disgust, and even of brutality, towards man in his sinfulness and weakness resulting from his initial fall from God’s grace.

For Augustine that original sin of Adam disrupted for all human time the divine order of things, and can be summed up in the cry of Othello the Moor, ‘And when I love thee not, chaos is come again’. It began with self-love and pride distorting the order of being between man and God, and resulted immediately in a radical distortion of the order within man himself. *Tu Deo, tibi caro:* you subject to God, and the flesh subject to you, is and should be the natural order of existence; and man’s gesture of contempt for God is inevitably echoed in his own being, and reverberates through human history in the ugly discord and disharmony of his own unruly feelings. A just punishment in Adam, is Augustine’s verdict, and its repercussions are justly shared by all of Adam’s seed, who now experience all too vividly the stirrings of another law in their members. The melancholy consequence of that original sin is that human nature is vitiated, and lust and ignorance are its lot, to such an extent that it lacks even the ability to appreciate the full seriousness of that first wicked act of disobedience which resulted in the whole human race, which had its roots poisoned in Adam, being a ‘condemned throng’, a *massa damnata*.

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33 ‘Hoc enim expedet, inferius subjici superiori: ut et ille qui sibi subjici vult quod est inferius se, subjiciatur superiori se. Agnosce ordinem, quaere pacem. *Tu Deo, tibi caro.* Quid iustius? quid pulchrius? Tu maior, minor tibi: servi tu ei qui fecit te, ut tibi serviat quod factum est propter te . . . . Si autem contemnis *Tu Deo,* numquam efficies ut *Tibi caro*’, *Enarrat. in Psalm.* 143, 6; *PL* 37, 1860. ‘Haec igitur carnis inobedientia, quae in ipso motu est, etiamsi habere non permittatur effectum, non erat in illis primis hominibus, quando nudi erant, et non confundeabantur. Nondum quippe anima rationalis domina carnis inobedienst exsitterat Domino suo, ut poena reciproca inobidentiern experiretur carnem famulam suam cum sensu quodam confusionis et molestiae suae’, *De pecc. mer. et rem.*, 2, 22, 36; *PL* 44, 173.
34 ‘Sed poena aeterna ideo dura et inusta sensibus videtur humanis, quia in hac infirmitate moribundorum sensuum deest ille sensus altissimae purissimaeque sapientiae, quo sentiri possit quantum nefas in illa prima praevia varicatione commissum sit . . . . Hinc est universa generis humani massa damnata’, *De civ. Dei,* 21, 12; *PL*
Augustine’s vehemence in urging and hammering home what he considered the Pauline and Catholic doctrine of original sin and its consequences (‘I didn’t invent original sin!’ he was to protest towards the end of his life\(^{35}\)) is often explained by two factors in particular—the heat of controversy and his own vivid personal experience. He would have claimed to experience the Pauline ‘law of sin which dwells in my members’ (Rom. 7: 23) all through his life. As Gilson well expresses it,

the point which dominates the whole history of the controversy is that Pelagianism was a radical negation of Augustine’s personal experience . . . . For many long years he had known the law without being able to carry it out . . . he saw it carried out by others, and although he longed with his whole soul to imitate them, he had to admit that he was unable to do so . . . [but] Thanks to Christ’s sacrifice, from now on there is a supernatural, divine assistance through which the law becomes something realizable for the human will, and failure to recognize the necessity of this assistance is the very essence of Pelagianism.\(^{36}\)

The other factor which is frequently advanced in justification, or at least explanation, of Augustine’s dark strain is the heat of battle or controversy, particularly in an area in which he had become the acclaimed authority and in which his long, almost obsessive, reflections on the subject had brought him to make some theological sense of his own inner experience. Peter Brown observes of Augustine’s role in the anti-Pelagian controversy, ‘Not every man lives to see the fundamentals of his life’s work challenged in his old age’.\(^{37}\) In all polemics, however, whether verbal or otherwise, frequently the first casualty is truth. And when the fires of altercation and retaliation have died or faded into history, the dead ashes which remain are cold and often chilling to the touch. What is more, after many a battle or famous victory the field is strewn with

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\(^{35}\) ‘Non ego finxi originale peccatum, quod catholica fides credit antiquitus’, De nupt. et conc., 2, 12, 25; PL 44, 450.


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shrapnel and pieces are picked up to be taken home and polished and become part of life’s more ordinary furnishings. Of the two major areas of moral theology in which the legacy of Augustine is most dominant and significant, his teaching on sexual morality will be fully considered later in this chapter. The other, relating to man’s freedom and God’s grace, can perhaps be best examined for our purposes by considering one piece of shrapnel collected by the Church from Augustine’s anti-Pelagian campaign to become a theological maxim enshrined in the Church’s moral tradition. It is his statement of the principle that God does not command of man things which are impossible to do.

‘Deus impossibilia non iubet’

It may seem contradictory, or at least inconsistent, of Augustine to have maintained that God does not ask the impossible of us in our moral behaviour, in view of his own youthful dissipation and his deeply pessimistic view of universal human experience since the fall of Adam. The main answer is to be found in his theology of God’s grace given through Christ to sinners, which in those thus reborn and regenerated makes all things possible in him who strengthens them (cf. Phil. 4:13). Thus it was that Augustine, in his Confessions chronicling his early life and conversion, could address God with the words, ‘Grant what you command, and command what you wish’. It was to this that Pelagius took exception. The strict Breton, or British, ascetic and reformer who was becoming increasingly influential in Roman Church society aimed to counter mediocre Christianity and to establish a uniform and demanding law of Christian conduct for all before an impartial God. And he would have no divine mollycoddling. Man was not so fallen that he could not brace himself to obey God’s commands; the more one stressed his natural handicaps the more one was pandering to him.

18 ‘Et tota spes mea non nisi in magna misericordia tua. Da quod iubes et iube quod vis... Continentiam iubes: da quod iubes et iube quod vis’, Conf. 10, 29; Pl. 32, 796. The prayer occurs as a refrain throughout Book 10 of the Confessions, which is devoted to a sustained consideration of temptations to sin. Cf. chapters 31 and 37 (Pl. 32, 798, 804).

19 As Augustine himself relates in De dono pers., 20, 55 (Pl. 45, 1026), ‘Quae mea verba Pelagius Romae, cum a quodam fratres et coepiscopo meo fuissent eo praeidente commemorata, ferre non potuit, et contradicere aliquanto commotius, paene cum eo qui illa commemoravit litigavit.’
and in danger of indulging him by relaxing or mitigating what God required of him. And the more one stressed God’s initiative and continuing help in grace the more one undermined man’s own responsibility for his own actions. Surely a good and just God made man such that his own will-power was sufficient to keep him away from sin?

Not so, replied Augustine, in his work significantly entitled Nature and Grace, and developing, as he loved to, the parable of the Good Samaritan (cf. Luke 10: 30–7). Everyone knows that man was created healthy, without fault, and with the power to live rightly. But we are now dealing with a man whom robbers have left on the road only half alive and who has been so grievously beaten up that he cannot get back uphill, to justice. He is still in the inn, recuperating. God, then, does not command things that are impossible. By his command he intimates that you should do what you can, and ask for what you cannot, through the healing medicine of grace.

The Pelagian line of argument was to deny the need for such grace by denying the transmission of Adam’s sin to all his descendents and by asserting every man’s innate freedom. To meet his threat more than two hundred African bishops assembled in Carthage in 418, in a local Council of which Augustine was ‘the soul’, and produced a systematic condemnation of the Pelagian doctrines which stressed the centrality of grace not only in enabling us to understand the commandments of God (which Pelagius was disposed to accept) but also in enabling us to love and have the

40 On the Pelagian controversy, cf. Brown, op. cit., pp. 340–407; J. Ferguson, Pelagius: A Historical and Theological Study (Cambridge, 1956). Pelagius’s fierce reaction to Augustine’s prayer of trusting surrender to God arose from his considering it ‘as destructive of all moral effort. To Pelagius the vast majority of professing Christians were taking one of two views. Some argued the inevitability of sin, some that only the grace of God could overcome it. Either led to moral sloth’.

41 ‘Verum est autem quod ait: “Quod Deus tam bonus quam iustus talem hominem fecerit, qui peccati malo euere sufficeret, sed si voluisset.” Quis enim eum nescit sanum et inculpabilem factum, et libero arbitrio atque ad iuste vivendum potestatem libera constitutum? Sed nunc de illo agitur, quem semivivum latrones in via reliquemur, qui gravibus saucius confossusque vulneribus non ita potest ad iustitiae culmen ascendere, sicut potuit inde descendere: qui etiam in stabilo est, adhuc curatur (Lc. 10: 30, 34). Non igitur Deus impossibilia iubet: sed iubendo admonet, et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis’, De nat. et gratia, 43, 50; PL 45, 1534, ‘Ideo in hoc agone magis nos Deus voluit orationibus certare, quam viribus.’
power to fulfil them, 'since each is God's gift, to know what we ought to do and to love in order to do it'.\textsuperscript{42} The year following Augustine’s death saw the General Council of Ephesus condemning Pelagianism in the teaching of his disciple Caelestius.\textsuperscript{43} And the Council of Carthage was to be quoted on the subject in the influential \textit{Indiculus} which drew further authority from being wrongly ascribed to Pope Celestine I on account of his warm support for Augustine’s memory.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite Augustine’s sustained and orchestrated opposition, however, Pelagianism became a strong and powerful movement throughout the Church, either in its full-blown version or in what was seen as the insidious and theologically subversive version which maintained that at least in man’s initial act of faith in God he did not totally require the help of grace, the view which was later to be described as semi-Pelagianism.\textsuperscript{45} Augustine’s uncompromising

\textsuperscript{42} ‘Item, quisquis dixerit, eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum propter hoc tantum nos adiuare ad non peccandum, quia per ipsum nobis revelatum et aperitur intelligentia mandatorum, ut sciamus, quid appetere, quid vitare debamus, non autem per illam nobis praestari, ut quod faciendum cognoverimus, etiam facere diligamus atque valeamus, anathema sit ... cum sit utrumque donum Dei, et scriere, quid facere debeamus, et diligere, ut faciamus, ...’, \textit{DS} 226. On Augustine’s role in the Council, cf. Portalié, op. cit., pp. 31, 190. On the various marches and countermarches of the campaign, cf. Brown, pp. 357-63. It was at this early stage in the controversy that Augustine, in a Sunday sermon, justified his unwearying (for him) preoccupation with those ‘men ungrateful for grace who attribute so much to helpless and wounded nature’, and adapted Gal. 2:21 to assert that ‘if justification were through nature, then Christ died to no purpose’. In exhorting his congregation to expose Pelagian sympathizers, he ended by explaining that through papal intervention the case was now closed. If only this applied also to the error! (\textit{Sermo} 131, chaps. 6, 9, 10; \textit{PL} 38, 732, 734). ‘Iam enim de hac causa duo concilia missa sunt ad Sedem Apostolicam: inde etiam rescripta venerunt. Causa finita est: utinam aliquando finiatur error!’


\textsuperscript{45} Cf. Portalié, p. 214. ‘Et ipsum igitur initium fidei nostrae, ex quo, nisi ex ipso est? Neque enim hoc excepto ex ipso sunt caetera: sed ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso sunt omnia. Quis autem dicat eum qui iam coeperit credere, ab illo in quem credit id nihil mereri? Unde fit ut iam merenti caetera dicantur addi retributione divina; ac per hoc gratae Dei secundum merita nostra dari: quod oblectum sibi Pelagius, ne dannaretur, ipse dannavit’, \textit{De praedest. sanct.}, 2, 4; \textit{PL} 44, 962. The term ‘semi-Pelagian’ was first used by the Reformers in the sixteenth century to characterize Scholastic theologians, becoming frequent in the seventeenth-century controversies on grace. It was first used in official Church teaching in the five
writings on the need for grace dismayed many, including monks in Africa and later in Gaul, on whom the ascetic Cassian was such a potent influence, since all value seemed thereby to be denied to human effort and therefore to their life of monastic striving for perfection. Augustine's attempts to mollify the monks aroused vehement reaction in the monasteries around Marseilles, and the disputes continued to wax after Augustine's death, his views being criticized by Cassian and maintained by the friend who may have been the real author of the Indiculus, Prosper of Aquitaine. It was at the instigation of the latter that Pope Celestine, who sent Germanus, bishop of Auxerre, to silence the Pelagians in Britain at St Albans, also wrote to the bishops of Gaul in praise of the memory of Augustine. Eventually, Caesarius, bishop of Arles, in Provence, with the approval of a later Pope, Felix IV, drew up a document of 'moderate Augustinism' which included the affirmation that it is possible for the just to observe God's commands. The document was accepted by a meeting of bishops at Orange in 529, known today as the Second Council of Orange, and the mind of Augustine is to be seen in its profession of faith that after receiving grace through baptism, all the baptized, with the help and co-operation of Christ, are able and obliged to fulfil what pertains to the soul's salvation, if they are willing to work at it faithfully... In every good work we do not begin it and are then helped by God's mercy, but he first inspires us with faith and love of him, so that we can with his help fulfil those things which are pleasing to him.

The statement of Orange was subsequently approved by Pope Boniface II, and then passed into obscurity for ten centuries until it was finally published only in 1538. The emergence of the propositions of Jansen (DS 2004–5), and later invoked against the Synod of Pistoia (DS 2618, 2626). Subsequently the term has become a convenient one to apply to those previously termed Massilians, in southern Gaul, whose opinions were condemned in 529 at Orange. Cf. Flick and Alszeghy, op. cit., pp. 202–3.

46 Flick and Alszeghy, pp. 203–5. Cf. supra, n. 44. 57 'post acceptam per baptismum gratiam omnes baptizati, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, quae ad salutem animae pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere... in omni opere bono non nos incipimus, et posse per Dei misericordiam adiuvamus, sed ipse nobis nullis praecedentibus bonis meritis et fidem et amorem sui prius inspirat, ut... cum ipsius adiutorio ea, quae sibi sunt placita, implere possimus', DS 397. Cf. 370, proem., Flick and Alszeghy, p. 205.

48 Flick and Alszeghy, pp. 205, 208–9.
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Augustinian teaching of the sixth century into the light of the sixteenth century was quickly seized upon by Catholic theologians, and opportune use made of it against Luther by the Council of Trent in its famous decree on Justification, in a section on 'the possibility of observance of the commandments'. 'No one, however justified, should use that rash formula forbidden by the anathema of the Fathers, that the precepts of God are impossible to observe by a man who has been justified.' For, continued Trent, reverting to the original Augustinian source, 'God does not command things which are impossible, but by his command he intimates that you should do what you can, and ask for what you cannot'. To which it adds, for good measure, 'and he helps you so that you can'.

Having thus entered into the mainstream of the Catholic Church’s official teaching, Augustine's axiom that God does not command things which are impossible was put to good use more than once in the years which followed Trent. Thirty years after the Council, the Belgian professor of Louvain University, Michel de Bay, had gone back beyond its teaching and the Scholastic age to study Scripture in the light of Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings, and had fallen foul of the Sorbonne in Paris as well as of other Universities. His extreme Augustinian views on man before and since the Fall were eventually examined and rejected by Rome, and in 1567 Pope Pius V condemned seventy-nine propositions taken from the works of Baius, as he is commonly called, including a statement that the view that God does not command the impossible is to be ascribed not to Augustine but to Pelagius!

With this defence of Augustine's and its own title deeds to the principle, the official Church was compelled to defend it again a century later in the first skirmishes of the Jansenist controversy. The bishop of Ypres, Cornelius Jansen, had given a lifetime to a
detailed and meticulous study of the works of Augustine, as we shall have cause to consider in more detail in a later chapter, and the pessimistic strain of Augustine was given full rein in Jansen's work published posthumously with the omen title *Augustinus*. Among the famous Five Propositions which were considered by Rome to sum up the errores of Jansen and his supporters, and which were condemned as such in 1653 by Pope Innocent X, is to be found the statement that ‘Some commandments of God are impossible for just men who will and attempt to observe them according to the present strength which they possess; and moreover the grace which would make them possible is lacking to them’.51

The bitter theological, religious, and political controversy involved in the Church's long and complicated struggle against Jansenism could only have the effect of it entrenching in its teaching the original polemical statement of Augustine against Pelagianism, and of rendering any qualification or mitigation of its content an apparent accommodation to the view of man and of his access to natural and supernatural resources which was a central feature of Jansenism and which was so repeatedly rejected by the Church. The principle that God asks of no one what is impossible but that his grace is always available thus was confirmed as a central moral and pastoral principle in moral theology in general and in the Church's moral teaching. And eventually in that teaching the wheel came full circle, when what had begun with the Augustine of the *Confessions* as an appeal for the interior grace of chastity and then been expanded by him into a general anti-Pelagian attack, to be espoused in various Church Councils and in papal teaching, was finally applied in 1930 by Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical on marriage, as a theological and pastoral comment on his condemnation of the practice of contraception.

Great care should be taken that regrettable external circumstances do not become the occasion for a more regrettable error. No difficulties can arise which can reduce the obligation of God's commandments forbidding acts which are evil of their inner nature, and in every situation married couples, strengthened by the grace of God, can always be faithful to their duty, and in their marriage preserve chastity from this dreadful stain. For the truth of

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the Christian faith stands expressed in the teaching of the Council of Trent ‘that no one, . . . [etc] . . . should consider the precepts of God impos­

sible . . . ’.52

The same teaching, the Pope continued, was again solemnly

commanded by the Church and confirmed in condemning the Jansenist heresy, which had dared to blaspheme against God’s
goodness by saying that some commands of God are impossible.53

When in 1968 Pope Paul VI repeated unchanged in his encyclical Humanae Vitae the teaching of his predecessor on contraception,

no explicit reference was made to the general principle of the

possibility or otherwise of observing God’s commands.54 It may be

possible, however, to discern the Augustinian axiom behind the

subsequent teaching on contraception of Pope John Paul II, in his

Apostolic Exhortation, Familiaris Consortio, issued in 1981, when

he writes that the law of God must be considered by married

couples ‘as a command of Christ the Lord to overcome difficulties

with constancy . . . . In God’s plan, all husbands and wives are
called to marriage in holiness, and this lofty vocation is fulfilled to

the extent that the human person is able to respond to God’s

command with serene confidence in God’s grace and in his or her

own will.’55

The loyalty and tenacity with which the Church’s moral tradition

has preserved the memento of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian campaign

that God does not command what is impossible suggest three lines

52 ‘At cavendum omnino est ne funestae externarum rerum conditiones multo

funestiori errori occasione praebant. Nullae enim exsurgere possunt difficultates

quae mandatorum Dei, actus, ex interiore natura sua malos, vetantium, obligationi

derogare queant; in omnibus vero rerum adiunctis semper possunt coniuges, gratia

Dei roborati, suo munere fideliter fungi et castitatem a turpi hac macula illibatam in

coniugio conservare; nam stat fidei christianae veritas, Synodi Tridentinae magisterio


53 ‘Eademque doctrina iterum sollemniterque praecepta est ab Ecclesia et

confirmata indamnatione haeresis iansenianae, quae contra Dei bonitatem haec

blasphemare erat ausa: “Aliqua ... [supra, n. 51]”’, ibid., p. 562.

54 ‘Ecclesiae doctrina ... sine dubio multis talis videbitur, ut non nisi difficultur,
immo etiam nullo modo servari possit ... Immoadem servari nequit nisi

opitulante Dei gratia, qua bona hominum voluntas fulcitur ac roboratur’, Humanae

Vitae, no. 20; AAS 60 (1968) p. 495. It appears hinted at, however, in the passage on

marriage as a faithful and exclusive union. ‘Quae coniugum fidelitas etsi interdum

habeat difficultates, nemini tamen asseverare licet, cum non esse possibilem, cum

contra quovis tempore nobilis sit meritisque uber’, ibid., no. 9; AAS, ibid., p. 486.

55 ‘Huius vocationis praestantia ad effectum deducitur, quatenus persona

humana praecepto Dei valet respondere, sereno animo gratiae divinae ac propriae

voluntati confisa’ Familiaris Consortio, no. 34; AAS 74 (1982), p. 125.
of reflection. The first is to ask whether the principle, as understood by Augustine, is unduly separatist, both in its consideration of man in himself and in its consideration of man within society. For Augustine, with his Neoplatonist background, man is viewed as ‘a rational soul using a mortal earthly body’, and although as a Christian Augustine believed in the goodness of the body, and in its eventual resurrection, this seems at times to have been against his earlier Manichaean and later Neoplatonist instincts. For him, grace is almost exclusively isolated in the will of man, in its attempts to exercise a spiritual mastery over the whole self. ‘You are to be subject to God, and the flesh to you.’ And one consequence of this anti-Pelagian stress on the will’s need of grace, and on the sufficiency of God’s aid to the will, systematically hammered home by the Council of Trent and subsequent magisterial reactions to Jansenism, has resulted for the Church in an impoverished view of grace which locates it for all practical purposes in the human will, as enabling the individual through sheer supercharged will-power to overcome all other personal and social deficiencies in his attempt to comply with God’s commands. Such a separatist view of grace, remote from the totality of the person and abstracting from other resources, or their lack, can easily sound like maintaining that a sufficiently high grade of petrol in a car will substitute for a faulty clutch or even for a lack of viable roads. All that is required is sufficient effort—God-given to be sure, and, if need be, as a return for earnest prayer that God will grant what he commands. But such recourse to earnest prayer can be viewed as simply switching the focus of one’s effort and will-power from one sphere of action to a preliminary and prevenient sphere.

Portalié, Brown, and others point out the paradox of Pelagian optimism, that in stressing man’s ability it also makes exigent moral demands of him. There is, however, a parallel paradox in the Augustinian view, that with the guarantee of God’s grace to the will, absolutely nothing that God commands is impossible of

57 Cf. supra, n. 33.
59 Brown, referring to Portalié, writes of the Pelagians’ aiming ‘to establish an icy puritanism as the sole law of the Christian community’, op. cit., p. 350.
achievement, and thus moral exigence is at least as salient a feature of Augustinism as it is of Pelagianism. Of both, in fact, it can be said that to whom much is given, whether by nature or by grace, of him or his will-power, much is expected. And that, moreover, irrespective of surrounding society. The very intensity of Augustine’s intimate personal communion and lifelong dialogue with his God, which is part of his appeal to all individuals, and the interior drama of the will which he so eloquently and often with exquisite sensitivity depicts in the life of the individual, serve to make the rest of mankind spectators rather than participants. Gilson observes that at least in his early years Augustine ‘was concerned most of all with the problem of his own destiny. For him, the important thing was to strive for self-knowledge and to learn what must be done in order to be better and, if possible, to be happy’. But grace, like sin, of which it is correlative, must also have a social dimension; and the doctrine of grace needs expanding not only beyond the controversial confines of the will to the other resources of man but also beyond the isolated individual to his surroundings and fellow human beings. With its internally and socially separatist tendencies Augustine’s theology of grace is at root unhistorical.

A second reflection on the Augustinian maxim that God does not command the impossible is to do with the theology underlying this principle, and with noting that it is primarily a statement about God, and not about man’s moral abilities. To hold another view would be tantamount to admitting that in some circumstances God compels man to sin by demanding of him what he is unable to do, and such action would argue injustice in God himself. It is of interest to note that, in vindicating the teaching of Augustine and its use against Jansenism, Pope Pius XI characterized the Jansenist heresy as daring to blaspheme against the goodness of God by saying that some commands of God are impossible. Divine omnipotence with regard to man is here at the service of divine goodness, and the tenacity with which the Church’s moral tradition has clung to the Augustinian defence of God’s goodness may go some way towards explaining its continual reluctance to give formal recognition to any ethical theory which entertains the possibility that at times the best a man can do is choose between two evils. Such a forced choice is envisaged as arguing not only a

60 Op. cit., p. 3.  
61 Cf. supra, n. 53.
limitation in man in his given circumstances but also a limitation in God’s power to transform those circumstances (by injecting grace to the will) and a limitation in his goodness, in requiring, or abandoning, man to do what is evil. We shall have occasion later to explore the implications of this strongly objective view of morality, and for the moment it may suffice to suggest that, to the extent that man’s being compelled to make deliberate choice of an evil course of action is seen as somehow a deficiency in God’s providence and in divine grace, to that extent it will meet with considerable Augustinian resistance.

The third reflection which the principle that God does not command the impossible evokes is that, from beginning to end of the history of the origin and application of this principle, it appears presumed that we always know exactly what God’s commands are. The whole thrust of the tradition is to assert that with grace man cannot be powerless before God’s just requirements. The content of God’s commands was not an issue between Augustine and Pelagius, Augustine himself acknowledging that Pelagius willingly admitted that God does help us, ‘with his law and his teaching’. This Pelagius was prepared to describe as external grace, not strictly necessary, but enabling us to do good more easily than we otherwise would.

Nor does the epistemological question figure in subsequent Augustinian controversies, all of which focus attention on fallen and redeemed man’s will, and not on his mind. As Gilson comments, in his study of Augustine’s thought, ‘philosophy is not the knowledge of what we must do but rather the power to do it’. And it may be surmised that one more or less explicit consequence of this in the Church’s moral tradition is to regard with suspicion any move which appears to qualify or mitigate God’s moral requirements of the individual and at the same time appears by implication to question the efficacy of God’s grace whatever the circumstances. Whether or not this be the case, it remains that this Augustinian efficacy only comes into play once one is satisfied that we actually are cognizant of God’s precepts.

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63 ‘Hinc itaque apparet, hanc [Pelagium] gratiam confiteri, qua demonstrat et revelat Deus quid agere debeamus; non qua donat atque adiuvat ut agamus’. De gratia Chr., 8, 9; PL 44, 364. It was not Augustine’s ‘iuhe quod vis’ which Pelagius strenuously rebutted; it was his ‘da quod iubes’.
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Augustinism and Sexual Morality

We have noted those writers who, while extolling the immense calibre and influence of Augustine’s thought, also felt it necessary to acknowledge, and attempt to explain, the dark and pessimistic strain in his works. One important authority who did not consider this necessary was Pope Pius XI. In his encyclical of April 1930, commemorating the 1500th anniversary of Augustine’s death, the only note which might be considered negative is his recalling the gentle warning of Pope Leo XIII ‘that the authority of Augustine is not to be preferred to the supreme authority of the teaching Church’. Of Augustine’s actual teaching, however, there is nothing but praise. It could be argued, of course, that it is not the purpose of a laudatory encyclical to find fault with a saint also considered the greatest Doctor of the Church. But it may be suggested that the reason lies deeper than that, in a genuine affinity which Pope Pius XI himself had with the thinking of St Augustine. He is clear, for instance, that Augustine had much to teach the twentieth century in its educational permissiveness which allowed for co-education and a lack of concern for lust in children and adolescents; in its entertainments which destroy innocence and chastity; and in its immodesty in dress. Augustine, the Pope shows in a lengthy quotation, provides salutary teaching that life is a struggle against evils, calling for the continual need of self-control against sin, even into old age.

The depressed tone of this papal teaching recurred a few months later in the customary Christmas Eve address to the Cardinals and the Roman Curia, when in an extremely gloomy review of the past year and a reference to ‘sorrows such as have never before been experienced in history’, Pius also referred to an encyclical letter which, despite delays, would shortly be published on the most important subject of Christian marriage. This was the setting in which the famous encyclical Casti Connubii was to appear. Its

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67 Ibid., p. 531, referring to the world economic recession, unemployment, anti-religious propaganda, natural disasters especially in Italy, persecution in Mexico, Russia, and China, difficulties for the Church, and the Pope in Italy (pp. 531–3).
68 Ibid., p. 537.
opening words, ‘Of chaste marriage’, have a distinctly Augustinian ring, and the theme of chastity is the dominant characteristic of the whole document, which is expressly directed against pernicious errors and depraved practices, some of which had even been conceded by a recent Anglican Lambeth Conference and all of which were gaining acceptance even among Catholics.  

A study of the making of moral theology, and here of the legacy of Augustine, can usefully consider the strongly Augustinian approach to human sexuality and marriage which pervades this most important statement on Christian marriage by Pope Pius XI, for it is explicitly based and structured on a systematic analysis of the three values of marriage as propounded by Augustine. In devoting the major section of the encyclical to analysing the three desirable qualities, or bona, of marriage, Pius may be seen as following in the line of Western Church teaching as contained in the Bull of union with the Armenians dating from the fifteenth-century Council of Florence, which described the Sacrament of marriage as possessing a ‘threefold good’ of ‘offspring’, ‘fidelity’, and ‘indivisibility’. The source for this conciliar teaching is an opusculum of Thomas Aquinas, which in turn relies on Augustine’s commentary on the Book of Genesis, and it is to that original source that Pope Pius resorts for his theology of marriage. Commenting on the divine institution of marriage, Augustine wrote:

Just because incontinence is evil, it does not follow that marriage, even that in which the incontinent copulate, is not good. This good is not culpable because of that evil, but rather that evil is forgivable because of this good. For the good which marriage possesses and by which marriage itself is good can never be a sin. And this good is threefold: fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. The point of fidelity is that apart from the marriage bond one does not have intercourse with another person. The point of offspring is that it be accepted lovingly, nourished tenderly, and brought up religiously. And the point of sacrament is that the union not be broken and that a man or woman sent away not be married to another even for the sake of offspring. This can be regarded as a pattern for marriage, for it either

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69 Ibid., p. 540. No explicit mention is made of Lambeth, but the allusion to it is clear in the encyclical’s vehement statement on contraception, ibid., p. 560.
70 ‘Assignatur autem triplex bonum matrimonii. Primum est proles suscipienda et educanda ad cultum Dei. Secundum est fides, quam unus coniugum alteri servare debet. Tertium est indivisibilitas matrimonii, propter hoc quod significat indivisibilem coniunionem Christi cum Ecclesia’, DS 1327.
embellishes the fruitfulness of nature or it controls the depravity of incontinence.\textsuperscript{71}

In the view of Pope Pius XI these three headings of Augustine are ‘rightly considered a most enlightening summary of the whole doctrine of Christian marriage’.\textsuperscript{72} The same teaching is to be found more succinctly in Augustine’s work on marriage, where he writes, ‘All these are the goods on whose account marriage is good; offspring, fidelity, and sacrament’.\textsuperscript{73} And it is this order of the Augustinian \textit{bona} of marriage which \textit{Casti Connubii} proceeds to follow, developing each of them in turn, diagnosing the deplorable contemporary abuses of each, and prescribing salutary remedies, all with telling reference as appropriate to the writings of St Augustine.

In so faithfully following Augustine in logic, sentiment, and even tone of language, this twentieth-century Church teaching on Christian marriage may be seen as the outstanding modern instance in recent moral theology of the legacy of Augustine. For him, sexuality was exercised either for children or for lust. St Paul had observed, in advising Christian couples about their mutual sexual rights, that he was writing ‘by way of forgiveness, not of command’. But if, Augustine concluded, there was scope for forgiveness, then there must be something culpable connected with even Christian sexual activity.\textsuperscript{74} It could not be intercourse as such...

\textsuperscript{71} ‘Neque enim quia incontinentia malum est, ideonunnium, vel quo incontinentes copulantur, non est bonum: imo vero non propter illud malum culpabile est hoc bonum, sed propter hoc bonum veniale est illud malum; quoniam id quod bonum habet nuptiae, et quo bona sunt nuptiae peccatum esse nunciam potest. Hoc autem tripartitum est: lides, proles, sacramentum. In fide attentur ne praeter vinculum coinnigale, cum altero vel altera concumbatur: in prole, ut amanter suscipiatur, benigni nutratur, religiose educetur: in sacramente autem, ut coniugium non separatur, et dimissus aut dimissa nec causa prole alteri coniungatur. Haec est tanquam regular nuptiarum, qua vel naturae decoratur fecunditas, vel incontinentiae regitur pravitas’, \textit{De Gen. ad lit.}, 9, 7, 12; PL 34, 397. The mediating text of Aquinas is his \textit{De art. fidei et Eccl. Sacr.}.

\textsuperscript{72} ‘Quae tria capita quae ratione luculentissimam totius de christiano connubio doctrinae summam continere iure dicantur, ipse Sanctus Doctor diserte declaravit, cum at...’, AAS, ibid., p. 543.

\textsuperscript{73} ‘Haec omnia bona sunt, propter quae nuptiae bona sunt: proles, lides, sacramentum’, \textit{De bono coniug.}, 24, 32; PL 40, 394.

\textsuperscript{74} 1 Cor. 7: 6 ‘by way of concession’ (RSV). Augustine’s Latin text read ‘veniam’. ‘Ubi ergo venia danda est, aliquid esse culpae nulla ratione negabitur’, \textit{De nupt. et conc.}, 1, 14, 16; PL 44, 423. Cf. \textit{supra}, n. 71, ‘veniale... malum’. It is instructive to note how from his Latin bible Augustine can develop or reinforce entire trains of theological thought. The most notorious instance of this, of course, is his reading of Rom. 5: 12, ‘ér’ ὥ πᾶντες ἤματον, ‘because all men have sinned’ (RSV), which Augustine took as ‘in quo (i.e., in whom) omnes peccaverunt’, and as
between husband and wife, because this had been instituted by God for the growth and continuance of the human race, and it would have occurred between Adam and Eve in Paradise had the Fall not intervened.\textsuperscript{75} What would not have occurred before sin entered into human history, however, were the overpowering intensity of sexual pleasure and the rebelliousness of the body, each of which was quite disruptive of human life. Consequently, it was only when sexuality was exercised within marriage with the express purpose of producing offspring, as God had commanded, that the lust and the disorder which now inevitably accompanied even its proper exercise might be considered pardonable. Thus it was that Augustine roundly condemned as a satisfaction of lust the abstaining from intercourse during fertile periods, which the Manichees had advocated as a means of avoiding the production of offspring in which spirit would be imprisoned.\textsuperscript{76} Thus also he was able to apodictic proof of all fallen mankind's primordial identity in Adam. ‘Quod autem dicit Apostolus, “in quo omnes peccaverunt”: “In quo” non intelligitur nisi in Adam, in quo eos dicit et mort; quia non erat iustum, sine crimine supplicium’, \textit{Contra Iulian. op. imp.}, 2, 63; \textit{PL} 45, 1169. Cf. \textit{Contra duas ep. Pel.}, 4, 4, 7; \textit{PL} 44, 614.

\textsuperscript{75} ‘Quamquam enim iam emissi de paradiso convenisse et genuisse commemorentur; tamen non video quid prohiberetur, ut essent eis etiam in paradisco honorabiles nuptiae, et torus immaculatus (Heb. 13: 4): hoc Deo praestante fideliter iustque viventibus, eique obedierent sancteque servientibus, ut sine ullo inquieto ardore libidinis, sine ullo labore ac dolore pariendi, fetus ex eorum semine gignerentur’, \textit{De Gen. ad lit.}, 9, 3, 9; \textit{PL} 34, 395.

\textsuperscript{76} ‘Nonne vos estis qui nos solebatis monere, ut quantum fieri posset, observaremus tempus, quo ad conceptum mulier post genitalium viscerum purgationem apta esset, eoque tempore a concubitu temperarerus, ne carni anima implicaretur? Ex quo illud sequitur, ut non liberorum procreandorum causa, sed satiandae libidinis habere coniugem censeatis . . . . Non autem matrimonium est, ubi datur opera ne sit mater: non igitur uxor’, \textit{De mor. manich.}, 2, 18, 65; \textit{PL} 32, 1373.

It is well known, of course, that Pope Pius XI, heavily dependent although he was on Augustine’s views on contraception, departed in this instance from the Bishop of Hippo’s teaching in a development which, to the puzzlement of many, has been maintained by his successors. ‘Neque contra naturae ordinem agere ii dicendi sunt coniugis, qui iure suo recta et naturali ratione utuntur, etsi ob naturales sive temporis sive quorundam defectuum causas nova inde vita oriri non possit. Habentur enim tam in ipso matrimonio quam in coniugalis iuris usui etiam secundarii fines, ut sunt mutuum adiutorium mutuusque fovendus amor et concupiscientiae sedatio, quos intendere coniuges minime vetantur, dummodo salva semper sit intrinsicus illius actus natura ideus ad primarium finem debita ordinatio’, \textit{AAS} 22 (1930), p. 561. Although Augustine might have admitted such ‘secondary ends’ a place in marriage (cf. \textit{infra}, n. 77), he would not have acknowledged them any legitimate weight in the marriage act. In condemning ‘any use of marriage in which the act is deliberately deprived of its natural power to procreate life’ (ibid., p. 560) as ipso facto an infringement of God’s and nature’s law,
explain, in ascending order of approval, that a Christian might live at peace with his wife either by fulfilling his carnal need with her, which Paul considered forgivable, or by fulfilling the procreation of children, or by fulfilling a brotherly companionship without physical contact, as Paul commended, having a wife as though he had none (1 Cor. 7: 29), 'which in the marriage of Christians is the most excellent and sublime'.\textsuperscript{77} To put the matter more trechantly, 'what father would agree to hand his daughter over to the lust of another man if it were not for children?'\textsuperscript{78} 

Pius XI was strongly influenced by Augustine's interpretation of the crime and punishment of Onan (cf. Gen. 38: 8–10), which more recent papal teaching has abandoned: 'Ilicite namque et turpiter etiam cum legitime uxore concumbitur, ubi prolis conceptio devitatur. Quod faciebat Onan, filius Iudae, et occidit illum proper hoc Deus', De coniug. adulter., 2, 12; PL 40, 479; AAS ibid., pp. 559–60. The other classic text of Augustine on contraception, which also condemns abortion, is important not only for its historical influence but also for the view of sexuality which it discloses and the contemporary motives and abuses which Augustine was castigating. 'It is one thing to have relations only with a wish to have a child, which is guiltless, and another thing to desire the pleasure of having relations, although only with one's partner, which has pardonable guilt. For even if one has relations not for the sake of producing a child, yet the motive of lust does not oppose the having of a child, either by bad intention or by bad action. Those who do oppose it may be described as married, but they are not; they preserve none of the truth of marriage, but only cover this shameful behaviour with a cloak of respectability. They are betrayed when they go so far as to disown any unwanted children they have. They resent nourishing or keeping those they were afraid to produce. And so, when secret iniquity turns upon the offspring which it has unwillingly produced, it emerges into the light as manifest iniquity, and covert shamefulness is convicted as open cruelty. Sometimes this lustful cruelty, or cruel lustfulness, goes to the length of procuring poisons of sterility. If that does not succeed, it somehow internally extinguishes and eliminates fetuses which have been conceived, wishing its offspring to perish before it lives, or else, if it was already alive in the womb, to be killed before it is born. Surely, if both partners are of such a kind, they are not married; and if they have been so from the start, they have come together more in immorality than in matrimony. If both are not of this kind, then I make so bold as to say that either the woman is some sort of whore of her husband, or he is an adulterer of his wife', De mupt. et concup., 1, 15, 17; PL 44, 423.

\textsuperscript{77} 'Potest igitur christianus cum coniuge concorditer vivere; sive indigentiam carnalem cum ea supplens, quod secundum veniam, non secundum imperium dicit Apostolus; sive filiorum propagationem, quod iam nonnullo gradu potest esse laudabile; sive fratrem societatem, sine uilla corporum commixtione, habens uxorem tanquam non habens, quo est in coniugio Christianorum excellentissimum atque sublime', De serm. Dom. in Monte, 1, 15, 42; PL 34, 1250. On the influence on Augustine of the virginal marriage of Mary, cf. de mupt. et conc., 1, 11, 12; PL 44, 420.

\textsuperscript{78} 'Recitatur liberorum procreandorum causa; ... nisi ad hoc dentur, ad hoc accipiantur uxorres, quis sana fronte dat filiam suam libidini alienae? Sed ut non erubescent parentes, cum dant, recitantur tabulea; ut sint soceri, non lenones', Sermo 51, 13, 22; PL 38, 345.
Behind this teaching of Augustine lay the fact that he had for long years been plagued with his own apparently very strong sexual drives and with the dissipation into which they dragged him. He was not merely humbled by this experience, but rather, as a proud man, he was humiliated by it, and his reason was affronted and philosophically scandalized at the insubordination of his body to the power of his will.79 It is scarcely surprising that it was in disorderly sexual arousal (and impotence), and in the shame and disgust which accompanied or followed it, that he experienced and witnessed the most blatant instance of that law of sin in his members on which he found St Paul so enlightening, and that he saw in such carnal concupiscence not only the terrible effects of original sin, but also the very channel through which that sin was transmitted from generation to generation. In Paradise there would have been tranquil obedience of the members to intercourse, not this shameful concupiscence of the flesh, which, as Delhaye expresses it, ‘soils the soul’ of the offspring generated.80 As it was, in order to procreate, this lust had now to be stimulated and used, so that ‘he who legitimately has intercourse by means of shameful lust is putting something evil to good use’.81

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79 Cf. de civ. Dei, 19, 21; Pl. 41, 649, ‘Serviens autem Deo animus, recte imperat corpori, inque ipso animo ratio Domino Deo subdita, recte imperat libidini vitiisque caeteris.’

80 Rom. 7: 23. ‘Ibi homo primitus Dei lege transgressa, aliam legem repugnantem suae menti habere coepit in membris, et inobedientiam suae malum sensit. Quando sibi dignissime retributam inobedientiam suae carnis inventit ... ubi autem ventum fuerit ut filii seminentur, ad voluntatis nutum membra in hoc opus creata non serviant, sed expectatur ut ea velut sui iuris libido commoveat, et aliquando non facit animo volente, cum aliquando faciat et volente? Hincne non erubescet humani libertas arbitrii, quod contemnendo imperantem Deum etiam in membra propria proprium perdidisset imperium?’ De nupt. et conc. 1, 6, 7; Pl. 44, 417–18. ‘In paradiso autem si peccatum non praecessisset, non esset quidem sine utriusque sexus commixtione generatio, sed esset sine confessione commixtio. Esset quippe in coecundo tranquilla membrorum obedientia, non pudenda carnis concupiscencia’, ibid., 2, 22, 37; col. 458. Delhaye, in Guilley, op. cit., p. vi. It was the inherent connection between uncontrolled male carnal ‘concupiscence’ and the transmission of original sin which enabled Augustine to explain the sinlessness of Jesus born of a virgin, Contra Iulian. op. imp., 6, 22; Pl. 45, 1552. The same line of argument could not, of course, be used of the conception of Mary herself, although Augustine was clearly unwilling to ascribe to the mother of God any stain even of original sin. Cf. de nat. et grat., 36, 42; Pl. 44, 267.

81 ‘Sic insinuantur haec duo, et bonum laudandae coniunctionis, unde filii generentur, et malum pudendae libidinis, unde qui generantur, regenerandi sunt ne dammentur. Proinde pudenda libidine qui licet concumbit, malo bene utitur; qui autem illicite, malo male utitur. Rectius enim accepit nomen malum quam boni, unde erubescunt et mali et boni’, De nupt. et conc., 2, 21, 36; Pl. 44, 457.
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The modern reader may well react to this Augustinian solution of putting something evil to good use by noting that in so thoroughly pursuing Paul’s teaching on the law of sin inherent in his being he had argued himself into a situation against which Paul had earlier warned his readers, that one ‘may not do evil that good may come of it’ (Rom. 3: 8). Nor did this escape Augustine’s most brilliant adversary, the Pelagian Julian, bishop of Eclanum in Southern Italy, who viewed the ‘Punic’ bishop’s views on nature, sin, and sexuality with considerable distaste, and generally charged him with not having shaken off his youthful Manichaeism, with all its tortured hatred of the body. Specifically Julian accused Augustine of teaching in his earlier works that in marriage the wrongfulness of concupiscence is rendered blameless through religion. Augustine’s brief rebuttal lacks his usual vituperative confidence.

It cannot be said here, as you think, “Let us do evil that good may come”, because marriage is not evil in any respect. The evil in their children which parents have not created, but only found, is not an evil of marriage. In the first married couple, who were not born of parents, it was through sin that there came about the discordant evil of carnal concupiscence, which marriage could put to good use; it was not through marriage, which would then quite rightly be condemned. Why do you enquire, then “whether I apply the term ‘purity’ or ‘impurity’ to the pleasure of intercourse between Christian couples”? It is not the pleasure, but the good use of that evil, which is termed “purity”; and because of this good use the evil itself cannot be called “impurity”. In fact, impurity is the disgraceful use of that evil, just as virginal purity is its non-use. Thus marital purity is preserved while evil is produced from evil through birth, to be cleansed through rebirth. 83

83 Unde non “crimen eius,” sicut calumniando loqueris, “impunitum fit per religionem;” quia nullius est criminis, quando per fidei bonum bene utitur libidinis malo. Neque hic dici potest, ut putas, “Faciamus mala ut veniant bona” (Rom. 3: 8); quia ex nulla sui parte malum sunt nuptiae. Non enim earum malum est, quod in hominibus quos parentes gignunt, non fecerunt, sed invenerunt. In primis autem coniugibus, qui ex nullis parentibus nati sunt, per peccatum accidit carnalis concupiscentiae discordiosum malum, quo nuptiae bene uterentur; non per ipsas nuptias, ut inde merito damnarentur. Quid ergo quaeas, “utrum in coniugibus christianis conventuum voluptatem, pudicitiam, an impudicitiam nominem.” Ecce respondeo, Non ipsa nominatur pudicitia, sed eius mali usus bonus; quo usu bono fit ut illud malum nec impudicitia possit. Impudicitia est enim eiusdem mali usus flagitiosus; sicut pudicitia virginalis, nullus. Salva igitur pudicitia coniugali, malum de malo nascendo trahitur, quod renascendo purgetur‘, Contra Julian., 4, 8; Pl. 44, 763. On the end not justifying the means, cf. more clearly Contra mendacium, 18; Pl. 40, 528.
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It looks, at least to a modern theologian, as if Augustine has missed the point of the difficulty into which his jaundiced view of sexual desire had led him, and which his systematic distinction between ‘use’ and ‘enjoyment’ was too blunt an instrument to handle with any delicacy. He held, in fact, that all the pleasures of the senses are evil as providing a series of titillating distractions from the main purpose of life—a well-ordered love of God. For him even the pleasure involved in eating and drinking is ‘an evil which we put to good use when through it we do no more than is conducive to good health’. Such pleasures of the table are tolerable if closely monitored, because they can always be accompanied by the mental pleasure of good conversation on matters of wisdom. But sexual pleasure, even when approached with the good intention of having offspring, is so engulffing that one cannot think then of anything else at all, far less of wisdom. ‘What lover of spiritual goods, even if married just for the sake of progeny, would not prefer to procreate children without such pleasure if he could, or at least without such intensity of pleasure?’

The attempt at a controlled, or canalized, ‘use’ of such intense pleasure in order to fulfil God’s command of procreation is not, Augustine seems to argue, creating something evil in order to produce a good effect, but turning to good use an evil which is now, all too regrettably, part of human nature.

84 ‘Et haec quidem vescendi atque potandi tolerabils est voluptas, quanta possumus intentione vigilantibus nobis, ut facilius non impelcat, quam modum aliquando victus sufficientis excedat: contra cuius concupiscentiam et ieiunando et parcius alimenta sumendo pugnamus; eoque mala bene tunc utimur, quando per illam nonnisi quod salutii conducibile est agimus. Ideo autem hanc voluntatem dixi tolerablen, quia vis eius tanta non est, ut nos a cogitationibus ad sapientiam pertinetibus, si in eas sumus mentis delectatione suspensi, abrumpat et deiciat .... Illa vero pro qua mecum tantis contentionibus litigas, etiam quando ad eam bona intentione, hoc est, causa propagandae prolis acceditur; tamen in ipso opere suo, quem permittit aliud, non dico sapientiae, sed cuisihibet rei aliiud cogitare? Nonne illi totus animus et corpus impendit, et ipsius mentis quadam submersione illud extremum eius impletur? ... Quis ergo amator spiritualis boni, etiam sola causa sobolis coniugatus, non mallet vel sine ista si posset, vel sine tam magna vi eius filios procreare?’ ibid., 4, 13; PL 44, 773-4. On the absorption of reason by sexual excitement, which the scholastics also were to consider completely unworthy of man made rational in God’s image, cf. de civ. Dei, 14, 16; PL 41, 424-5.

85 ‘Aliud quippe est malo bene uti, quod iam inerat; et aliud est malum perpetrare, quod non erat, Contra Julian., 4, 7; PL 44, 758.'
is ‘using’ is rather than indulging in it, or ‘enjoying’ it. But the difficulty for Augustine lies not simply in his experience of being engulfed by such pleasure. Perhaps even more crucial to his position is the unruly character of sexual arousal to which, in the candid climate of the time, he frequently draws attention as an indication of the power of sin and the powerless of the will. The paradox of procreation for sinful man is that such physical and significantly embarrassing disorder needs to be deliberately resorted to, with more or less success, if man is to fulfil his religious duty of procreation. And this aspect of the charge of teaching that the end justifies the means is one to which Augustine does not appear to have given much consideration.

Lacking, of course, from Augustine’s introspective make-up was any positive appreciation of women, and he seems to have considered them as little more than sex objects. He could not for the life of him think of any reason why woman should have been given to man other than for the procreation of children, ‘as the soil is a help to the seed’. She was physically weaker and her friendship could not compare with that of another man. Love he appears to have evoked from his concubine, whom he had picked out casually and who, on being dismissed so that he could make a respectable marriage, vowed that she would never know another man. And fond of her he may have been, although with a disordered love and ‘largely imprisoned by the powerful habit of sating an insatiable concupiscence’. He was not long in procuring another mistress to fill in the two years before his intended marriage, needing a focus for his sexual restlessness and being, as he explained, ‘not a lover of marriage, but a slave of lust’. In the event, after his conversion he

86 ‘Si autem quaeritur, ad quam rem fieri oportuerit hoc adiutorium, nihil aliud probabilerer occurrerit, quam propter filios procreandos, sicut adiutorium semini terra est, ut virgultum ex utroque nascatur’, De Gen ad lit., 9, 3, 5; Pl. 34; 395. Cf. ibid., 9, 11, 19; col. 400. On the enormous importance for Augustine of male friends and their companionship, cf. M. A. McNamara, Friends and Friendship for St. Augustine (New York, 1988). Interestingly different is the case of Jerome. ‘Strongly sexed but also, because of his convictions, strongly repressed as well, his nature craved for female society, and found deep satisfaction in it when it could be had without doing violence to his principles’, J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome: His Life, Writings, and Controversies (London, 1975), p. 91.

87 ‘In illis annis unam habebam, non eo quod legitimum vocatur, coniugio cognitam, sed quam indagaverat vagus ardom, inops prudentiae’, Conf., 4, 2; Pl. 32, 693–4. ‘Interea peccata mea multiplicabantur, et avulsa a latere meo tamquam impedimentum coniugii, cum qua cubare solitus eram, cor ubi adhaerebat, concisum
decided not to marry, feeling that ‘there is nothing which overthrows a man’s mind so much as female caresses and that physical contact without which one cannot possess a wife . . . . And so, I think quite rightly, and helpfully for my freedom of soul, I have commanded myself not to desire, or seek, or marry a wife’.

It could be urged in defence of later theologians who consciously drew upon Augustine’s writings, whether in context or through medieval anthologies such as Lombard or the Glosses on Scripture, as it could equally be claimed of the systematic recourse to Augustine in expounding in Casti Connubii the Church’s teaching on Christian marriage, that to draw upon Augustine is not necessarily to be uncritical nor, in particular, to be wedded to his entire theology of human sexuality and marriage. Gilson remarks that some people ‘seem to be born Augustinians; but it would probably be truer to say that each of us has his Augustinian moments, his Augustinian moods’.

It also seems necessary to observe, however, that all Augustinian intellectual positions interlock and reinforce each other, so fundamental and all-pervasive are his basic doctrines on both God and man, and so dominant in his thinking is the classical concept of ordo, or the divine order of all things. This being so, to quarry texts from Augustine out of the overall landscape of his life and mind-set is to incur the danger of ignoring that they were fashioned within that context and are dug from a particular vein of thought which may contain not only
precious elements to be treasured but also impurities to be refined.\textsuperscript{91}

With such a strong repugnance for human sexuality as it is experienced, and such a lifelong preoccupation with its disorder as the effect and at the same time the medium of original sin, it is no wonder that for Augustine 'our righteousness in this life consists in the forgiveness of sins rather than in the perfection of virtues'.\textsuperscript{92} It was this pervasive sinfulness, in human sexuality and in life in general, which was to preoccupy moral theology in the aftermath of Augustine and in the light of what Guilley terms 'the pessimistic aspect of Augustinian anthropology'.\textsuperscript{93} ‘The fact that theological speculation in the West was concentrated in the first place on the weakness of fallen man could not but have a decisive influence on its further development.'\textsuperscript{94}

\textit{The Mind of Augustine}

With the separation of the East and the eclipse of Greek culture, Latin theology, derived from St Augustine, dominated the Middle Ages, and inspired the Reformers. So from St Thomas to Malebranche, from St Bernard to Jansenius, the history of theology and philosophy was bound up with the fortunes of Augustinism, just as if this were a second tradition mingled with the first, as if it had given, on the threshold of the new age, a new version of the Christian message.\textsuperscript{95}

If the theology is the man, that is eminently so in the case of Augustine in reflecting his subtle and tempestuous mind and the dramatic alternations of his life and thought. Newman, for instance, Jean Guitton suggests, would have found the anti-Donatist bishop hard, violent, and bitter, more African than Latin.\textsuperscript{96} And certainly, for all his tenderness and mystic yearning, there is also to be found a violence, not only of language, but also in Augustine’s very way of thinking.

In his Introduction to the Bettenson translation of \textit{The City of...}
God, David Knowles recognizes Augustine’s ‘marvellous powers of psychophysical analysis’ which helped to make him ‘one of the supreme thinkers and theologians of the Christian centuries’.

Yet he also notes that much in Augustine’s works presents ‘dissatisfaction for those who wish for clear-cut edges’. And he calls attention to that ‘characteristic Augustine avoidance of clear distinctions that runs through so much of his thought’. It may be suggested, in fact, that for much of the time Augustine does not make distinctions, he offers dramatic alternatives, highly charged opposing poles. He is not a logician or a Schoolman, but a most skilful rhetorician who is disposed more to set up extremes than to explore the middle ground between them. It is this quality of his mind which often contributes to the appeal of many of those terse phrases and brilliant tensions which have so charmed and delighted his readers, as well as making him the most quotable, and quoted, of theologians. So often with Augustine it appears to be all or nothing, black or white, which he has to offer, as may perhaps be grasped at its most cosmic in his depicting of the two cities and the two loves from which they have sprung. ‘We see then that the two cities were created by two kinds of love: the earthly city was created by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the love of God carried as far as contempt of self.’

Underlying the thought of Augustine, it is suggested, there is to be found at work not a philosophical dualism or simply an ethical or moral dualism, but a mental dualism, a dyadic approach to reality. And while such a chiaroscuro of the mind may make for good rhetoric, and certainly for rousing polemics, or for swaying a congregation or a jury, rhetoric and polemic do not always make for good theology. They can lead to violent or extreme language and entrenched positions, in which words become weapons with which to crush an adversary rather than the inadequate counters of that humble exploration of divine reality which should be characteristic of theological discourse.

If this attempt to understand the workings of the mind of Augustine in terms of mental extremism has any validity, then

98 Ibid., p. xii.
99 Ibid., p. xxi.
100 De civ. dei, 14, 28 (trans. Bettenson, p. 593); PL 41, 436. ‘Augustine’s thought was always in a state of tension’, Brown, op. cit., p. 327.
increased significance must be given to the question of Guitton about Augustine’s profound influence on all subsequent Christian thought. ‘We may ask if the recapitulation of tradition round a single survivor does not mean an alteration of it, since it is then depicted in the exclusive colours of an individual mind and career. The qualities, then, of an individual destiny are liable to be taken by many generations as rules of thinking’\textsuperscript{101} As far as moral theology is concerned, one may conclude, that disquiet expressed by Guitton in general is copiously borne out in the legacy of Augustine to this particular subject. Today, however, it is in process of re-assessment, through Augustinian studies; the recovered interest in the Latin West of pre-Augustinian writers and of the great Christian theologians of the East; the long-delayed Catholic renaissance in biblical studies; the positive orientation given to moral theology by the Second Vatican Council; and the reintegration of moral theology with a renewed dogmatic and spiritual theology. In this process the strengths and insights of Augustine will be brought into truer relief and his contributions to the understanding of man’s return to God be the more appreciated for being one, but only one, great theologian’s dramatic projection of reality, to be balanced by those of others more optimistic and more temperate. In introducing his magnificent series of mature homilies on the Gospel of John, Augustine explained that ‘perhaps not even John said what actually is, but even he only as he was able’\textsuperscript{102} At least in his more eirenic moments, Augustine would surely not have wished more to be said of himself.

The legacy of Augustine in Christian thought remains incalculable, ranging from his plumbing what he considered the worst of human misery to soaring passages of great beauty and Latin eloquence. The restlessness of his mind and his heart throughout his long life came to find final resolution only in death and in his indissoluble cleaving to God—his only real good—as fulfilling at last that longing which he described, in concluding his great history of the world, for ‘the eternal rest not only of the spirit but of the body also. There we shall be still and see; we shall see and we shall love; we shall love and we shall praise. Behold what will be, in the end,

\textsuperscript{101} The Modernity, p. 78.
\textsuperscript{102} ‘Forsitan nec ipse Joannes dixit ut est, sed et ipse ut potuit’, In Joan., 1, 1; PL 35, 1379.
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without end! For what is our end but to reach that kingdom which has no end?\textsuperscript{103}

As for Augustine’s legacy to moral theology, as the one single individual in Christian history who has had most influence on the making of moral theology, one may recall Gilson’s remark that some people seem to have been born Augustinians but that everyone has his Augustinian moods and moments.\textsuperscript{104} But the Church was not born Augustinian. And although for 1500 years it has experienced something more than an Augustinian moment in its moral thinking, it now appears to be in the difficult process of shaking off its long Augustinian mood.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{de civ. dei}, 22, 30, 5 (trans. Bettenson, p. 1091); \textit{Pl.} 41, 804. The monosyllabic English does no justice to the rhythmic beauty and sonority of Augustine’s final \textit{rallentando}: ‘Ibi vacabimus, et videbimus; videbimus, et amabimus; amabimus, et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine. Nam quis alius noster est finis, nisi pervenire ad regnum, cuius nullus est finis?’

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Supra}, n. 89.